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INTRODUCTION 
In 1895 the question of the Venezuela boundary dispute "afforded 
opportunity for an emphatio reaffirmation ot the Monroe Dootrine and tor 
a notable viotory of the prinoiple of arbitration."l The applioation ot 
the Monroe Dootrine to aot as a panaoea for this oontroversy was to bring 
about a olearer and more exaot detinition and also with this a new 
perspeotive of the Monroe Dootrine ot 1823. 
It is easily realized and noted that in 1823 the Monroe Dootrine 
direoted muoh attention in the prooess of its birth but the nation at that 
time little realized the importance that would be attaohed to that document 
with the passing ot time and with the oocurrence ot various incidents that 
would seek shelter in some of the clauses of the Monroe Doctrine. 
It is therefore with this perspective that I have tried to gather 
together some information relative to the general oontroversy between 
British-Guiana and Venezuela in 1895 to show that the oontroversy originated 
as tar back as 1493 and to ascertain the position held by President 
Cleveland and his oolleagues, the opinions of some ot the oritios of the 
time and the general attitude of the Amerioan people toward our stand in 
this issue. 
1Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Cammager. The Growth of the American 
Republic. Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, II, 326. 
1 
2 
It will be seen by the conclusion of this thesis that the British.Guiana 
Venezuela dispute was a complete viotory for the spirit of arbitration. The 
deoision of the special tribunal was indeed favorable to Great Britain but it 
was also a victory for the American people in the upholding of the prinoiples 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Once again the principles of the Monroe Doctrine had 
been challenged and once again they held their ground. This incident as the 
others that had preoeded it would serve only as lessons of example when the 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine were again challenged before the turn of a 
quarter of a century. 
CHAPTER I 
ORIGIN OF THE BRITISH-VENEZUELA CLAIMS 
The British-Guiana Venezuela dispute over the extent of the boundaries 
of British-Guiana is regarded by many as an issue of the period of 1895 
but historical research tells us that the controversy originated as early as 
2 1493 in the document of Pope Alexander VI. Pope Alexander VI issued a 
papal bull on May 3, 1493, acknowledging the title of Spain to new lands 
discovered in the West towards the Indies in the Ocean Sea.3 This was not 
to the liking of Ferdinand of Spain who desired a document that would have 
tar-reaching implications and on September ~6, 1493, the Pope issued a second 
bull that stated that "a sovereign's title to new lands had to rest upon 
effective occupation in addition to mere discovery.n4 This received papal 
confirmation in a bull issued by Pope Leo X on November 3, 1514.5 
About the same time the Papal Bull of May 4, 1493, set up a line of 
---------------
2Charles Callan Tansill. The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard 1885-1897. 
Fordham University Press, New York, 1940, 621, citing Francis G. 
Davenport. European Treaties Bearing on the History ot the United States 
and its Dependencies. Washington, 1917, I, 56-63. 
3Ibid• 
4 
Ibid., citing 79-83. 
5-
~., citing 112-117. 
3 
p 
4 
demaroation between Spanish and Portuguese territory at one hundred leagues 
west of the Cape Verde Islands (Azores). On June 7, 1494 a seoond line of 
demaroation was established by the Treaty of Tordesillas that provided that 
this line ot demaroation should extend trom pole to pole three hundred and 
seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands thus giving Portugal a title 
to Brazi1.6 
The original title of Spain to Guiana territory between the Orinoco 
and the Amazon is based upon discovery and occupation. In 1498 Columbus 
sighted the island of Trinidad and then Venezuela.' Alonso de Ojeda, a 
lieutenant of Columbus in 1499 explored the northeast coast ot South America. 
He sighted an Indian village made of pile dwellings in the Gu1t of Maracaibo 
and because it reminded him of Venioe he called the region Venezuela which 
means "little Venice."8 
Spanish settlements were made on the coast of Venezuela in 1527 and 
within a period of four decades Car'cas9 and in 1777 the Captaincy-Genera1 
of Venezuela. It consisted of the provinces of Guiana, Cumanl, Maraoaibo 
---------------
6 
William Spence Robertson. The History of Latin-American Nations. Second 
edition; D. Appleton..century Co., New York, 1937, 82. 
8Ibid• 
9 
Robertson, 82. 
~' 1 
5 
and the island ot Margarita and Trinidad. lO While the Spaniards were 
making their settlements the Dutch were preparing to seek claims in Guiana 
Which the Spaniards had not ettectively occupied as yet. According to the 
decree ot 1493 and 1514 it was stated that a sovereign title to new lands 
was based upon ettective occupation. ll 
In the early part ot the sixteenth century charters were granted and 
settlements established by Spain in parts ot South America. In 1530 a 
grant was made ot Guiana by the Spanish monarch to Diego de Ordaz which 
included the coast fram the Orinoco to the Amazon. Other Spanish 
expeditions are recorded also in the sixteenth century which ascended 
further into the Orinoco as is the one undertaken by Antonio de Berrio 
, 
who started out in 1582 from Santa Fe~ the capital of the New Kingdom of 
Granada to the Meta and Orinoco and made settlements on the island of 
Trinidad and Santo Tham~ and in 1591 in the territory ot Guiana.12 Antonio 
de Berrio was appointed by the Spanish monaroh as Governor and Captain-
General ot Guiana and the boundaries of territory over which Spain exercised 
her jurisdiotion were designated as the Orinoco and the Amazon.13 In 1595 
Spain sent an expedition ot colonists, missionaries and soldiers trom the 
mother oountry. 
-----... -.. _-----
10 
Tansill, 622. 
l~id. 
12J • M. de Rojas, 2. 
13 
Ibid. 
, 
6 
In 1581 the Netherlands proclaimed a formal renunciation ot Spanish 
14 
sovereignty and w~r raged between Spain and the Netherlands until 1648. 
During this period the Dutch on a mercantile venture voyaged to Guiana in 
I 1598 up the Orinoco to Santo Thame. However no Dutoh settlement was made 
on the coast ot Guiana prior to 1613 when the Spaniards destroyed a Dutoh 
settlement upon the river Corentin. The Dutch West India Company was 
ohartered in 1621 and began to contest Spain's Amerioan possessions and in 
a short time they were able to make settlements along the west bank: of the 
Essequibo River.15 
The Dutch held on to their settlements in Guiana and on January 30, 
.. 1648, in the Treaty ot Munster which terminated a war ot more than seventy 
years between Spain and the Netherlands, the Spanish government reoognized 
the title ot the United Provinces of Holland to all the territories held 
in her possession at that time in South Amerioa. 16 No ettort was made on 
the part ot either power in the treaty to try to tix the boundary of said 
territory although many oartographers tried to picture tixed boundaries 
whiohwere not accepted. 
---------------
l4Ibid• 
15 Tansill, 622. citing Report and Accompanying Papers of the Commission 
appointed by the President ot the United states "to investigate and 
report upon the true divisional line between the republic ot Venezuela 
and British Guiana." Washington, l896-189~ 9 vols., I, 61. 354-375. 
16p• Ezequ1el Rojas translated to Se~or Jos' Andrade. The Case ot Venezuela, 
A Reply to the British Blue Book Entitled "Documents and Correspondenoe 
Relating to the Question or Boundary Between British Guiana and Venezuela." 
~he Franklin Printing and Publishing Co., Atlanta, Georgia, 1896, 9. 
p 
7 
Thus by the Treaty of Munster the war between Spain and the 
Netherlands oame to an end and Spain aoknowledged the independenoe of the 
Netherlands. Spain also aoknowledged the Netherlands' possession of the 
places that She held and possessed at the end of the war whioh consis~ed 
of Surinam, Berbice, and Essequibo.17 
During the next period of one hundred and fifty years the Dutch 
continued to establish settlements along the Essequibo, Cuyuni, Massaruni 
much to the dislike of the Spanish. During this period there also arose a 
dispute between Spain and the Netherlands as to the rightful possession of 
territo~ west of the falls of Cuyuni and on the coast of Essequibo.18 The 
Spanish representatives of Guayana took it upon themselves to take action 
and charged ~hat the Netherlands had invaded Spanish territory and thus 
they destroyed a Dutoh trading post.19 
This general state of affairs continued until 1814 when the Dutoh 
finally ceded to England western Guiana (Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice -
later known as British Guiana). With this oession went also the indefinite 
boundary20 Whioh ~u1d result in the revival of the question of the boundary 
limits of this area at a later date. 
--.... _--.. _-- ... _--
17~., :3. 
18Ibid• , 5. 
19Ibid• 
-
20A• Curtis Wilgus. The Development of Hispanic America. Farrar and 
Rinehart Inc., Publishers, New York, 1941, 803. 
jill 
8 
The second party to the dispute was Venezuela which had in turn been 
/ declared a Captaincy-General in 1777 directing the provinces of Cumana. 
Guiana. Maracaibo and the islands of Margarita and Trinidad. In 1810 a 
revolution took place in Venezuela whioh resulted in the final declaration 
of independence on July 5, 1811. This revolutionar.r movement was further 
assured by the assistanoe and leadership of Bolivar and in the final 
surrender ot Puerto Cabello in November 1823 whioh brought the war to an 
end. From 1820-1830 Venezuela was part of the Great Colombian Republic 
atter whioh Venezuela beoame a separate state and reoeived the recognition 
ot the United States on Februa~ 28, 1835, and of Spain on Maroh 30, 1845.21 
In oonsequences of this renunoiation and 
cession His Majesty recognizes the Republic 
of Venezuela as a tree sovereign and inde-
pendent nation. composed of the provinces 
and territories mentioned in her Constitution 
and other post,rior laws, to wi;: Margarita, 
Guayana, Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, Carabobo, 
Barquisimeto, Barinas, Apure, Merida, TrUjillo. 
Coro and Maracaibo, and any other territories 
or islands Which may belong to her.22 
The question of boundary limits was thus bequeathed in turn to Great 
Britain and Venezuela respeotively by the Netherlands in her oession to 
Great Britain in 1814 and by Spain to Venezuela in 1811. Thus the disputes 
and controversies whioh were formerly theirs were passed on and were to 
---------------
2lRobertson, 219. 
22J. M. de Rojas, 6, citing Venezuelan Constitution, Article II, vol. iii, 
48-49. 
p 
9 
become a great issue espeoially in the seoond administration of President 
Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney. 
CHAPTER II 
ROBERT SCHOMBlfHGK'S COMMISSION 
There was indeed not a great lapse of time between the time that Eng-
land and Venezuela exeroised and assumed jurisdiotion over their newly 
acquired territories and the time when both parties would be seeking as 
muoh of the land that could be obtained that eaoh began extending her olaims 
as far as possible without any authority to do so. England asserted olaims 
as far as the region north of the Orinooo River and Venezuela north of the 
Essequibo River. 
In 1835 the British Government oommissioned a German-English surveyor 
and naturalist, Robert Hermann Sohomburgk on an exploration trip into the 
interior of the Guiana area. On November 28, 1840, he was sent as ·speoia1 
oommissioner to survey and delimit the boundary of the co1ony.n23 On 
January 13, 1841, Venezuela was informed of the assignment made to Sohom-
burgk and immediately steps were taken to get the Venezuelan Foreign Office 
to negotiate a treaty settling the Guiana boundary.24 When this idea was 
expressed it was refused on the basis that Sohomburgk had probably started 
to oarry out his assignment of the surveyanoe of the interior of Guiana.25 
23Tansi1l, 622, oiting Viscount Palmerston to Sir H. K. Porter, November 28, 
1840, British Parliamentary Papers, 97, London, 189. 
24 
~., oiting O'Leary to Smith, January 30, 1841, 190. 
25Ibid • 
10 
p 
11 
The purpose of Robert Hermann Sohomburgkts expedition was to bring 
about some information of a survey nature in the disputed area. The Dutoh 
had settled on the Essequibo River and the Spaniards on the Orinooo. but no 
definite line of demaroation had been drawn. ~nen England was oeded the 
Dutoh territory in West Guiana in 1814 no definite boundaries were 
established. When Venezuela deolared her independenoe it was also essential 
to her to establish a definite boundary line. Venezuela olaimed the 
territory north of the Essequibo River and England olaimed the region north 
of the Orinoco River. Both powers wanted as much of the land as they could 
obtain and thus they extended their claims to the farthest limits. It was 
under this pressure that Robert Schomburgk worked. As he began a survey he 
realized the commeroial and strategio value of the Orinoco and he set up 
26 posts at Point Barima and at the mouth of the Amacura River. He submitted 
to the British Government a report of his findings together with maps and it 
was this Sohomburgk line which beoame the basis of British claims and it was 
also the line that was followed olosely by the Tribunal of Arbitration on 
October 3. 1899.27 
It is olaimed that in 1840-1842 Schomburgk had surveyed another line 
whioh would be desirable to Great Britain and this was known as Sohomburgkts 
~--------------
26 
Ibid •• oiting Sohomburgk to Gov. Light. June 22, 1841. British Parliamen-
tary Papers. 97. 192-201. 
27 
Robert Sohomburgk. A Desoription of British Guiana Geographioal and 
Statistioal: Exhibiting Its Resouroes and Capabilities together with 
the Present and Future Contention and Prospeots of the Colon I. 
Simpkin. Marshall and Co •• London, 1840, 125. 
12 
Expanded Line. This map is said to have been kept secret and filed in the 
seoret archives until it was published in 1886.28 
Sohomburgk asserts his authority of the Dutoh claims in the eighteenth 
oentury primarily on Hartsinck's Dutch West India Companl which considered 
the mouth of the Orinoco as the limits of their possessions.29 
In an interview submitted to by Professor Emil Ludwig Scharff in the 
New York Times on January 2, 1896, the stress is made as to the un-
reliability of Schomburgk's map. The general opinion and information given 
by Professor Scharff is that the maps of Schomburgk were drawn up and 
circulated as an aid to the field of botany. He claims from information 
furnished to him through his father, Professor Theodore Soharff, late of 
the Imperial School of Metz that Schomburgk was not sent by any government 
but set out on a private, scientific expedition. Whenever he sighted 
British huts or camps he would make a notation of their looation mainly for 
the benefit of scientists who would want to looate some of the flora 
described and the notation of location would aid them. It is olaimed that 
when the Governor General of British Guiana learned of Schomburgk's expedi-
tion he contacted him and acoepted his information as an aid in the settling 
30 
of the dispute. 
In 1841 the dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain began with the 
establishment of a sentry-box on whioh the British flag was raised in 
---------------
28 
J. M. de Rojas, 126. 
29 
Ibid., 130, citing memoirs July 1, 1839 addressed to Gov. Light. 
30 . New York T1mes, January 2, 1896, 2. 
13 
31 
Venezuela. Venezuela wanted this matter cleared up. On November4 18, 1841, 
the Venezuelan minister believed this to be the work of Schomburgk commis-
sioned by Great Britain to delimit boundaries and expressed the great dis-
32 
satisfaction of the Venezuelans in regard to this act. It was the hope of 
the Venezuelan minister as well as the people of Venezuela that some compen-
sation would be made to right this error. The British reply was made on 
December II, 1841, on which Lord Aberdeen expressed the idea that the posts 
erected by Schomburgk "afforded the only tangible means by which Her 
Majesty's Government can be prepared to discuss the question of the bound-
33 
aries with the Government of Venezuela." By January 31, 1842, Lord Jber-
deen had sent a message to the governor of British Guiana instructing him 
to remove any posts that had been placed by Schomburgk. The British still 
held their claims.34 The difficulty was that Britain had claimed on the 
west of British Guiana a large area that was also claimed by Venezuela. 
On January 31, 1844; a suggestion of boundary was made by Lord Aberdeen 
to Venezuela which proved unsatisfactory and was dismissed.35 For a short 
time there was a lapse in diplomatic negotiations until they were again 
resumed in 1851. 
-----_ .... -.. _----
31 
Grover Cleveland. The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, 1913, 6. 
32 
~., 7-8. 
33 ~., 11. 
34 
Ibid., 10. 
35 
~., 14. 
p 
14 
In 1851 the Venezuelan minister in London inquired of Lord Aberdeen 
about the Schomburgk survey and he received the assurance that the Schom-
burgk posts at the mouth of the Orinoco would be removed. The minister 
suggested to Lord Aberdeen that negotiations be carried out to definitely 
36 
fix the boundary line between the two countries. The Venezuelan and 
British governments made extravagant claims. Britain agreed to give Vene-
zue1a complete control of the mouth of the Orinoco River. but Venezuela did 
37 
not favor this proposal and negotiations were suspended. This was further 
complicated by the discovery of gold mines near the Yururai River in 1850. 
There was great fear lest Britain occupy this area despite the note reassur-
ing the Venezuelans on November 18, 1850. -disavowed any intention of 
occupying or encroaching upon the disputed territory; hence in a like spirit 
of good faith and friendliness. the Venezuelan Government cannot object to 
38 
make a similar declaration to Her Majesty's Government." The Venezuelan 
Foreign Office replied with a similar note. 39 
On November 14, 1876, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs sent 
a note to Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary in which he expressed 
the hope that the boundary would be settled. On November 14, 1876, the 
Venezuelan Government sent a note to Secretary Fish appealing to the United 
36 
Sohomburgk. 126. 
37 Ibid • 
............ 
38 
Tansill, 623, citing Belford H. Wilson to Sellor Lecuna, November 18, 1850. 
British Parliamentary Papers, 97, 263-264. 
39 
Ibid. 
, 
------------------------------------------------~ 
15 
states for aid "as the most powerful and the oldest of the Republics of the 
new oontinent; whose duty it was to lend its powerful moral support to Latin 
American States in their disputes with European Powers."40 A message was 
sent to the British Government with a statement of the claims they sought 
in Venezuela together with the emphasis that a settlement of the dispute 
was desired. The British Government however awaited the ooming of the 
representative of the British Government before proceeding with any steps 
in the Venezuelan dispute. The visit of the representative of British 
Guiana was delayed and Lord Salisbury emphasized it would be more expedient 
-to agree upon a frontier of aocommodationwhich shall satisfy the respect~ 
interests of the two countries.,,41 "Her Majesty's Government was anxious to 
meet the Government of Venezuela in a spirit of conciliation and would be 
willing ••• to waive a portion of what they consider their strict right, if 
Venezuela" is really disposed to make corresponding conoessions on her 
40 
41 
Ibid., 625, citing Secretary Calceno to Seoretary Fish, November 14, 1876, 
~te Ex. Document, 220, 50 Congress, 1 session, 3-4. Also Cleveland. 
The Venezuelan ~oundary Controversl, 22-23. President Cleveland wrote to 
ir. Fish: *But whatever may be the result of the new steps of the 
Government it has desired that the American Government might at onoe take 
cognizance of them, convinoed as it is, that it will give the subjeot its 
kind consideration and t&.ke an interest in having due justioe done to 
Venezuela." 
Ibid., oiting Lord Salisbury to Rojas, May 19, 1879, British Parliamentary 
PaPers, 97, 293-294. The Venezuelan representative in London waited for 
the arrival of the British Guiana representative which was delayed until 
May 19, 1879. 
16 
About this time gold was discovered in the disputed area and all efforts 
and peaceful negotiations were postponed. .A suggestion was made to consider 
the mouth of the Moroco River as the frontier, but this was rejected by the 
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville and he suggested a line further to 
the north. Rojas oonsidered this idea and agreed to a line one mile north 
of the mouth of the Moroco River. If this was refused by Britain, Rojas 
made the suggestion that the whole issue be offered up for arbitration.43 
The main objection to the line set up by Rojas was that there were many 
British inhabitants included in the territory suggested by Rojas and 
Granville suggested that a line be designated which would give Venezuela 
control over the mouth of the Orinooo River and reduced the territory olaimed 
for England under the Schomburgk line. 44 
President Cleveland said of Granville's proposal that it was "laoking 
46 
almost every feature of ooncession. ft The next move was taken by Rojas whb 
turned to the United States for aid. A note was sent to Washington to 
Seoretary Evarts on Deoember 21, 1880, protesting the British interests at 
Barima Point. In reply Seoretary Evarts wrote to Camacho: 
42 
Ibid., citing Lord Salisbury to Rojas, January 10, 1880, British 
Parriamentary Papers, 296. 
43 
Ibid., citing Rojas to Lord Granville, February 21, 1881, 298-299. Also 
see-map relative to the Venezuelan Boundary ~uestion on page 19. 
44 
~., citing Granville to Rojas, September 15, 1887, 299-301. 
46 Grover Cleveland. Presidential Problems. The Century Co., New York, 
1904, 207. 
II 
,I 
p 
~~------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
••• in view of the deep interests which the 
Government ot the United States takes in all 
transactions tending to attempted enoroe.ch-
menta of foreign powers upon the territory 
of any of the republios of this oontinent 
this Government oould not look with indifferenoe 
to the forcible acquisition of such territory by 
England •••• This Government awaits therefore, 
With natural concern the more particular 
statement promised by the Government of 
Venezuela. whioh it hopes will not be long 
dele.yed.46 
17 
The statement regarding Barima Point did not reaoh Washington until Novem-
ber, 1882, and at this time Frelinghuysen was Secretary of State and he 
advocated arbitration. 
About this time ex-President Guzm~ Blanco the representative of the 
Venezuelan Government to England and France oame to confer with Frelinghuysen 
about settling the dispute. Frelinghuysen did all in his power to press the 
need of settling the dispute. In November, 1883, Dr. Rafael Seijas pro-
posed that the British Government submit the question of the disputed terri-
tory to arbitration. Britain remained in great fear of arbitration lest the 
decision tend to favor Venezuela. Probably the greatest objeotion was that 
the nations were not in the habit of leaving it up to an arbitrator to decide 
such a vital issue as an important boundary line.47 
In 1884 Lord Granville refused arbitration but by 1895 he finally 
conceded to a general treaty of arbitration that would settle all disputes 
46 Tansll1, 627, citing Secretary Evarts to Camacho, January 31, 1881, 14. 
47 
~., 630. 
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and arguments that might arise between countries. This was a hopeful out-
look for ending the dispute~ but it was disrupted when Lord Salisbury on 
July 27, 1885, repudiated any steps ventured into by Lord Granville and he 
stated that Great Britain could not enter such a course of action as that 
48 
suggested by Venezuela of referring disputes to a court of arbitration. 
48 
Ibid., 631, citing Lord Salisbury to Guzmln Blanco~ July 27~ l885~ Senate 
~Document~ 226~ 50 Congress~ 1 session~ 133-138. Granville announced 
to Blanco that the British Government was ·unable to concur in the assent 
given by their predecessors in office to the general arbitration article 
proposed by Venezuela ••• To engage to refer to arbitration all disputes 
and controversies whatsoever would be without precedent in the treaties 
made by Great Britain." 
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CHAPTER III 
CLEVELAND'S FIRST SIGN OF INTEREST IN VENEZUELA 
Grover Cleveland beoame interested in the Venezuela boundary dispute 
in his first administration beoause it had oaused some uneasiness in 
Washington. Amerioan observers were of the opinion that Britain was anxious 
that the dispute should not be settled and when the opportunity arose - that 
is, when Venezuela beorune preoooupied and involved in a neighborly squabble 
England oould oleverly step in and secure the desired boundary.50 
In Maroh, 1885, Se~or Soteldo, the Venezuelan Minister sent a 
communication to Bayard. In a second communioation he expressed the wish 
that his government desired to follow any plan that the Republio of the 
North might have in mind for Venezuela. 5l Bayard was obliged to answer 
that the United States could not take into consideration suoh a request 
52 
unless it was submitted to by both parties. 
50 
Allan Nevins. Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage. Dodd, Mead and Co., 
New York, 1938, 630. 
51 
Tansill, 633, oiting Soteldo to Secretary Bayard, April 29, 1885, Senate 
Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 50-52. 
52 
~., citing Secretary Bayard to Soteldo, July 21, 1885, 53-59. 
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Any possibility of progress in regard to the settling of this dispute 
_as lost sight of until in 1886 negotiations were made with Roseberry. 
Roseberry suggested a line by which Great Britain would have control of the 
53 Guaima River, and the Orinooo would be free to oommerce and navigation. 
Blanoo suggested that arbitration inoluded all the territory west of the 
Essequibo River. 54 Great Britain however did not show any interest in 
accepting these demands but instead planted posts up the Orinoco and set up 
placards or signposts showing the limits of the British claims. This move 
taken by Great Britain made it olear that she was acoepting Schomburgk's 
56 line as the boundary of British Guiana. 
Great Britain had undoubtedly tired of proposing boundary lines that 
they favored but were unacceptable to the Venezuelans. Venezuela in return 
became greatly peeved because of the pressure placed on her by Britain to 
meet monetary olaims. In addition the ire of Venezuela was greatly aroused 
after the British Colonial Office List of 1885-1886 estimated that the 
British area made an estimated increase of 76,000 square miles in 1886 to 
100,000 square miles. 56 
53 
Ibid., oiting Lord Iddesleigh to F. R. St. John, October 23, 1896, British 
Pirriamentary Papers, 97, 372. 
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Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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Venezuela began to fear the imperial ~bition of Great Britain in South 
America and the attention of the United States was also aroused as we shall 
see later. The thing that was feared was the procedure of Venezuela to 
occupy any point in the dispute which might cause a diplomatic crisis. 
In one instance Bayard in a message to Phelps said: "The doctrines we 
announced two generations ago ••• have lost none of their force ••• in the 
progress of time.u57 
In 1887 diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Great Britain were 
suspended. J. A. Olavarria tried to adjust matters when he dispatched a 
note in the nature of a request to be presented to the United States to act 
IS arbitrator of this boundary dispute. The general contents of the note 
read as follows: 
---------------
57 
••• urge or insist upon arbitration by Great 
Britain and also that the Venezuele.n Government 
wished the United States to become the arbi-
trator. I (Bayard) told him that we should be 
very glad to lend our good offices in favor 
of arbitration, but that we could not suggest 
the United States as arbitrator; that such a 
suggestion must come from both parties; that 
at the joint request of both we would be 
unable to decline, but that we could not 
propose ourselves upon the recommendation of 
either. He said that he understood that and 
that Venezuela would make the suggestion that 
the United States should be arbitrator. 58 
Tansill, 636, citing Secretary Bayard to Phelps, December 30, 1886, 
Senate Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 67-68. 
58 . • Ib1d., 638, cit1ng memorandum written by Bayard after a conversation with 
~arria, May 2, 1887, Bayard MS. 
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Many efforts were made at restoring negotiations between Venezuela and 
Great Britain but Venezuela refused to agree to anything until the disputed 
territory had been oleared of English offioials. In addition Britain was 
seeking payment of an indemnity as oompensation for the seizure of two of 
her vessels by the Venezuelans in 1883 and finally Venezuela paid. 59 
The Venezuelan Government was greatly annoyed because it believed that 
Britain was laying olaim to as much territory as she oould with little oon-
sideration of her rights to it and Britain even went so far as to dispute 
the olaims of the Venezuela railway grants which were definitely beyond 
60 dispute. This attitude naturally aroused a general feeling against 
Britain's so-oalled policy of imperialism and thirst for oonquest. 
Thomas F. Bayard believed that England had no suoh plan in mind of 
extending her politioal sovereignty. Bayard as Tansill relates was not as 
easily swayed as Cleveland and Olney by the Venezuelans and beoause of this 
he put great trust in Great Britain for whioh he was later to receive 
severe oriticism.6l 
Diplomatio relations between Venezuela and Great Britain were in a 
critioal oondition and with the inoreasing demands of the British olaims 
the two powers were on the verge of war in 1888. An effort was made to patoh 
---------------
59 
~., 639. 
60Ibid., citing Olavarria to Secretary Bayard, February 15, 1888, Senate Ex. 
DOCUment, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 201-202. 
61 
~., 645. 
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up the difficulty by a "return to the status quo of former years.-62 
Venezuela still remained aloof to any settlement of the dispute and 
this defiant attitude was probably adopted beoause of the assuranoe of the 
sympathetio support of the United States. lhe Venezuelan Minister aided 
things by presenting the oase to the Amerioan authorities so as to give the 
impression that Venezuela was the viotim of English expansion. Britain on 
the other hand did not present its oase beoause at the time it was not 
63 
regarded as an important issue. 
The question of the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary did not assume 
the momentous that it would achieve in the seoond administration of 
Cleveland. The dispute was revived time and time again from the period of 
the Robert Sohomburgk oommission to the first and second administrations 6f 
Cleveland. Within a fairly short time this dispute would lead to the 
opening of new ohannels whioh would in turn lead to disoussions of the 
applioability of the Monroe Doctrine. 
64 Jefferson regarded the Monroe Dootrine as a sort of quid pro quo. 
-Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in 
the broils of Europe. Our second never to suffer Europe to meddle with 
---------------
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65 
oisatlantio affairs." As Olney said. -American non-intervention in 
Europe implied European non-intervention in America. As long as the 
principle is maintained there can be no fair oharge of inconsistenoy.a66 
One oan easily realize the position of the United States at this time 
for earlier leaders had set up a polioywhioh in reality was only a 
presidential pronouncement namely. the Monroe Dootrine and this dootrine 
beorune very important in the history of our nation. Although it was not 
classified under international law it was oonsulted in many instances for 
important pronouncements that it contained. The principle motive for the 
Monroe Dootrine has been given as one of self-defense against European 
aggression. self-preservation and the aoquisition of territory with view onl 
67 
of the safety of the country. Thus Monroe in his message said. 
-----.. --------
65 
~., 261. 
66 
Ibid. 
We owe it therefore to candor, and to amicable 
relations existing between the United States 
and those (Allied) powers to deolare that we 
should consider any attempt on their part to 
extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peaoe and safety • 
••• We could not view any interposition for 
the purpose of oppressing them, the independent 
South .~erican countries or oontrolling in any 
other manner their destiny by any Europeam 
power in any other light than as the manifes· 
tation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States.68 
67 
Edward J. Phelps. America and Europe: A Studl of International Relations: 
Monroe Dootrine. Putnam's Sons, New fork. IS9 , 86. 
68 
~ •• 84. 
CHAPTER IV 
I 
THOMAS F. BAYARD, DIPLOMATIC ATTACHE 
Thomas F. Bayard, an American statesman and diplomat was born in 
Wilmington, Delaware, October 29, 1828. The Bayard family represented the 
state of Delaware for four successive generations in the United States 
Senate. Thomas F. Bayard practiced law until 1868; in 1885 he was chosen by 
Pr~sident Cleveland as Secretary of State and in Cleveland's second admin-
istration he was appointed United States Ambassador to England. 
The position of Thomas F. Bayard was different from the belligerent 
attitude of Clevele~d and Olney. He did all in his power to keep friendly 
relations between the United States and Great Britain. When a request was 
sent to the United States to aot as arbitrator Thomas F. Bayard replied by 
saying that in order for such a step to be taken a request must come from 
both parties concerned.69 Bayard also tried to emphasize to Great Britain 
70 
that the Monroe Dootrine wae in full force. 
In 1889 Thomas F. Bayard'S term of office as Seoretary o~ State drew to 
a close. He then went to Wilmington, Delaware, to resume his law practioe. 
---------------
69 
Tansi11, 638, citing memorandum written by Bayard after a conversation 
with Olavarria, May 2, 1887, Bayard MS. 
70 Ibid., 639, citing Olavarria to Secretary Bayard, September 22, 1887, 
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While he resumed his legal practice he did not divert his attention from 
foreign affairs. It was not therefore surprising despite different 
attitudes toward different policies that Cleveland made an offer to Bayard 
to beoome his Secretary of State in his second administation. It is stated 
by some authorities that Bayard refused this offer "because he dreaded the 
high expense and preferred to be our first Ambassador to Great Britain. n11 
The offer was then made to Judge Walter Q. Gresham who at first refused. 
The general feeling in political circles however felt that Bayard would 
72 
again assume the office of Secretary of State. There is an aocount of a 
letter that Bayard wrote to William F. Vilas on February 8: 
From you, Mr. Cleveland and I have no secrets • 
••• It is not possible for me to refuse the 
best that I can give to such a man in such a 
cause, and this is what I tOld him, and so the 
matter was left, and now stands. He will need 
all the aid he can obtain, and it is a question 
of ascertaining and distributing foroes. If he 
oan find to his own satisfaotion someone with-
out my fa.u1ts, and with more than my oharacter 
to go into the State Department, I want him to 
do so, and you, my dear friend, will know that 
my "if" only means whether he has time to look 
the right man up, for I draw great comfort from 
the belief that our country does oontain a ••• 
kind of strength in its unknown oitizens. You 
see I oannot tell you positively whether I will 
be in offioe again or not, nor will I stop to 
weigh minor1S •• oonsiderations. I only want to do my duty. 
71 ~., 653, oiting Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 511. 
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Ibid., oiting Wade Hampton to Bayard, January 29, 1893, Bayard MS. 
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This correspondence seems to imply that Bayard would have been only too 
glad to serve as Secretary of State providing that the Chief of State had 
desired him to do so. It is also apparent to most historians that the 
excuse given by Bayard as an office of "high expense" was irrelative if the 
Chief of State believed that his appointment to this office would be help-
. 74 ful to the nat10n. It seems however that Cleveland was greatly relieved 
when he received a letter of acceptance from Gresham. 75 
Within a month's time Cleveland had found a place for Bayard in the 
76 
appointment as Ambassador to England. Bayard expressed his gratitude to 
Cleveland for the confidence he showed in bestowing upon him such an honor 
as this position hale. 77 Bayard also received the congratulations of many 
political leaders. 
When Bayard arrived in Southampton in June, 1893, he expressed the 
idea he was glad to set foot in England, a land of liberty similar to that 
78 
of his mother country. He also felt a great sense of responsibility and 
he felt that it would be a means by which he would be able to bring together 
74 
~., 654. 
75 
76 
Ibid. 
Ibid., citing Cleveland to Ifl. Q. Gresham, Februe.ry 9, 1893, Cleveland MS. 
"Cleveland had raised the rank of diplomatio representation in England 
from that of Minister to Ambassador." 
77 . Ibl.d. 
78 
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79 
the interests of the United States and England. He saw and realized the 
great value of his position and he hoped that if any misunderstanding arose 
between the two great powers he should be able to remove them. Little did 
he realize that before long he would be used as a go-between of the United 
States and Great Britain in one of its major boundary oontroversies, namely 
the British-Guiana Venezuela boundary dispute. 
Bayard in this position was the target of muoh critioism as that of 
Olney who was outraged that Bayard would not oooperate in supporting a 
80 program of hostility towards England. 
Bayard stated his position in 1893 when he expressed the view that he 
did not believe that the European powers were interested in Latin America 
81 
with the purpose of carving it up into spheres of influence. He also 
showed a friendly feeling toward Great Britain and he sinoerely hoped that 
nothing should arise that would imperil this situation.82 Thus with the 
question of the Venezuela boundary dispute coming again into the limelight 
it is little wonder that he expressed grave concern over the diplomatic 
relations of the two powers. 
79 
Ibid., 656, citing London Daily News, June 12, 1893 also London Times, 
June 12, 1893. 
80 ~., 660. 
81 Ibid. 
82~., 661. 
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Thomas F. Bayard wrote from London in 1893 that at the time Great 
Britain was very much preoccupied with other affairs in other parts of the 
globe. He also emphasized that England did not favor any disagreements with 
the United States. He went on to say that "the • •• European nations are 
~atching eaoh other like pugilists in a ring. n83 
Bayard's efforts to keep amioable relations between the two powers 
were further complicated in October, 1894, by a pamphlet published by 
William L. Scruggs, a former minister to Venezuela under Harrison. This 
pamphlet British Aggressions in Venezuela or The Monroe Doctrine on Trial, 
contained a brief outline of the Venezuelan controversy and it aimed to show 
that Britain was violating one of America's policies namely the Monroe 
84 Doctrine. Copies of this pamphlet were sent to the editors of the lead-
ing newspapers and magazines in the United States and England, to members 
of Congress, to Governors and leading members of the General Assemblies of 
85 
the States, to public libraries and to principal olubs. 
The theme of this pamphlet was to emphasize the importance of Amerioa's 
resisting and disputing any claims England might make that would be 
83 
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85 
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" ••• within the territory and jurisdiction of an independent American 
1 . ,,86 Repub loC •••• If the United States did not resist England's interfer-
ence in the New World she would in reality be falling back on her policy 
of 1823. If she abandoned the policies that were adopted by her predeces-
87 
sors she would also be sacrificing her national honor and prestige. 
Scruggs efforts to arouse American public opinion did not end here for 
he was equally determined to bring the Monroe Doctrine to the attention of 
the American People. With the aid of Colonel Leonidas F. Livingston of 
Georgia he was able to introduoe a resolution whioh backed the President's 
suggestion to arbitrate the dispute. This resolution was unanimously 
approved by the House on February 13, 1895, and it was also adopted by the 
88 89 
Senate. On February 20, Cleveland signed the resolution. 
Much public opinion was aroused especially in Smerica where a great 
effort was made to stress the importanoe of amioable relations of the 
English-speaking peoples. Quite the opposite in public opinion was stressed 
in other circles where the feeling was one of general suspicion of Great 
Britain. It was stated that since 1844 England had pushed her claims 
86 
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forward in Venezuela and also had refused arbitration. In addition, Great 
Britain had violated the Monroe Doctrine. The expressed views of many 
~merioan leaders was to enforce the Monroe Doctrine so no other power would 
90 
violate it. This was the general attitude of many Amerioans who were 
suspioious of Britain's land grabbing. 
Seoretary Gresham was very muoh opposed to the stand taken by Great 
Britain in the British-Guiana Venezuela boundary dispute. He stated that 
the position taken by Great Britain was unjust and he maintained if Great 
Britain persisted in this position that he would be forced -to oall a 
halt. tr9l Gresham made this statement but he remained hopeful that amioable 
92 
relations between the United States and Great Britain would be restored. 
It was indeed fortunate for Bayard that Gresham also showed interest in 
keeping friendly rela-cions between Great Britain and the United States. 
Little did Bayard realize that before too long there would oome a oomplete 
change in the Department of State in the person of Riohard Olney. 
With the accession of Olney to the office of 
Seoretary of State on June 8, 1895, the stage 
was being set for a new politioal play in 
which this belligerent Boston lawyer was to 
play the part of the bold knight that rescued 
defenceless Venezuela from the clutohes of 
perfidious England. It was a stirring 
90 H' H Henry Cabot Lodge. England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine. 
North American ReView, New York, (June, 1895), CLX, 657-658. 
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melodrama that captured the fancy of most 
Amerioan audiences. and it was not until 
later that the publio peroeived that the93 Venezuelan maiden was a worthless wenoh. 
33 
CHAPTER V 
THE ROLE OF GRESHAM .AND OLNEY 
Grover Cleveland's foreign policy during his administration was 
94 
entirely different from the policies of Blaine, Seward and Ray. His 
policy had the tendency of being one strictly opposed to any vestiges of 
tmperialiam and for this the Hispanic-American nations breathed a sigh of 
95 
relief. The government of Chile in 1893 expressed joy on the entry of 
Cleveland into power and sent him a message which declared that "hi.s restor-
ation was a pledge that the United States would preserve the tranquillity 
96 
and well-being of all nations upon the American continent." Cleveland 
also wrote a letter to Bayard in whioh he told him of the great weloome 
given him in Washington by the representative of Central and South Amerioa 
97 in 1893. 
Grover Cleveland developed an interest in the Venezuelan boundary 
dispute in both of his administrations. Grover Cleveland had definitely no 
reason to be favorable to England because of the Sackville-West inoident 
whioh oost him the eleotion of 1888. When Cleveland returned to the White 
-... ------------
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House in 1893 he was again oonfronted with the problem of Venezuela and soon 
after Cleveland had taken oare of his presidential duties he turned to 
98 
consider the problem or Venezuela whioh had dragged on too long. It was 
greatly feared by Cleveland and by others that this "looked like a oase of 
99 land-grabbing at the expense of a weak nation." Cleveland beoame more 
vexed also when he learned that British troops made an effort to oolleot 
100 
olaims for damages by seizing the oustoms house at Corinto. Nicaragua. 
Therefore in 1893 Cleveland was 
suddenly faoed with a ohoioe not any greater 
than that whioh the Roman Senate had to make 
when the Mamertines invited it to oooupy part 
of Sioily. and thus abandon the polioy of 
isolation which had hitherto confined Roman 
expansi on 1» the peninsula. As the Roman 
power aocording to Polybius long hesitated 
to commit itself to so fearful an intervention. 
so the American Government was now to hesitate 
for half a dozen years before embarking upon a 
definite oourse of expansion.10l 
Cleveland made it known by his message to Congress in 1894 that he 
would take interest in the Venezuelan question. He said he would renew 
his efforts to bring about arbitration knowing that England had on other 
102 
oooasions agreed to the prinoiple of arbitration. From the time of the 
98 
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Civil War to the Spanish-American War there were many disputes with Great 
Britain suoh as the Alabama olaims, the Bering Sea oontroversy, the Alaskan 
103 boundary dispute, all of whioh were settled by arbitration. 
Cleveland urged our Americs,n Ambassador, Thomas F. Bayard to interview 
Lord Kimberly and to enoourage a settlement of the dispute. Bayard inter-
viewed Lord Kimberly, the British Foreign Seoretary on January 23, 1895, and 
reported to him the strong feeling of the Amerioan Government to bring this 
dispute to a olose. On February 20, he interviewed him again and in his 
report he emphasized that Lord Kimberly was very cool and said that Britain 
"refused to arbitrate anything east of the Sohomburgk line or any area long 
104 
settled by the British." He also gave the impression that Great Britain 
105 
would try to hold on to the territory at the mouth of the Orinooo River. 
In ~ril, Don M. Diokinson oame to the White Bouse and gave Cleveland 
some information about the map Kimberly had shown him regarding British-
106 Guiana. According to this Britain was asserting olaim to the Orinoco. 
In April, 1894, diplomatio negotiations between Nicaragua and Great 
Britain were dispensed with. Several British subjeots had been dismissed 
from Nicaragua and others were arrested for whioh Lord Kimberly demanded 
_ ... _---_ ... --..... _-
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107 ~ 76,000 in damages. British ships arrived into Corinto, Nicaragua 
seeking payment of the said demand and after this payment was refused four 
108 hundred English marines and sailors seized the custom-house. The 
I Nicaraguan government protested to Cleveland. tor the drastic measures taken 
by the British but nothing could be done by the United States because it was 
the same procedure that they had taken in ~egard to Chile. The incident 
109 
closed with the payment of the indemnity by Nicaragua. 
Don Dickinson however did not keep silent in regard to this question, 
but he made a speech in which he denounoed the British policy. He took his 
pressure ott the British interests in Nicaragua and in the West Indies and 
he concentrated especially on the Venezuelan question. 
In the present conditions, he said with reter-
ence to Bayard's Anglophile speeches, we may 
indulge in a reciprocity of polite phrasing 
and post-prandial exuberance, if our alert 
w& tchmen will meantime keep an eye upon our 
good triends across the Atlantic, especially 
when, having appropriated Africa, the islands 
and even the rocks of the sea, and wherever 
else force or intrigue may gain a footing, 
they begin to take an interest, not altogether 
born ot curiosity or of a purely Christianizing 
spirit, in this hemisphere.110 
Because of his close association with the President this speech oarried great 
107 
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.eight and aroused much comment. 
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On May 9, Cleveland asked of Fairchild for suggestions as to whom to 
, 
send as a representative to Caracas. He was greatly conoerned over sending 
a capable representative and was perhaps greatly worried lest it would not 
112 
appeal to anyone oonsidering the salary was only $7500. 
Cleveland was greatly irritated by Britain's refusal to arbitrate and 
he was soon led to believe that the great powers were willing to rob the 
weaker nations.113 This attitude was encouraged by the policies pursued in 
the partitioning of Africa, England and Germany's struggle over Samoa, 
France's interest in Madagascar, English interests and difficulties in the 
114 Transvaal and Japan's interest in Korea. 
As Dr. Bryant once said of Cleveland that he was 
temperate in all things, unless undully irri-
tated by those who would annoy him persistently 
and selfishly - then appropriate and emphatic 
remarks were made. Again and again he endured 
opposition or misrepresentation patiently for 
a long period, and then suddenly exploded with 
a force which astonished observers who had not 
noticed the tokens of rising international 
wrath.115 
It was perhaps this side of his character that urged him to suggest to 
his Secretary (Walter Q. Gresham) to draw up an intensive report on the 
.,-----.. -------~ 
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Venezuelan question. Unfortunately Gresham took cold while engaged in this 
work and was taken seriously ill and died on May 28. The entire cabinet 
had great affection for Gresham who was more than a business partner. he 
116 
was in the true sense a friend of a frank and simple nature. Cleveland 
above all expressed great sorrow for the loss of his official associate 
117 
and for the loss of a dear friend. 
While Gresham was taken ill Richard Olney assumed the task of working 
on the Venezuelan problem and on June 10. he succeeded him as the Secretary 
O &> State .118 0'_ i h di t1..-• ~ cont nued to work on t e preparation of a 'spatch uut 
was to be sent to Ambassador Bayard in London. Olney as well as Cleveland 
was of the conviction that this problem had dragged on definitely too 
119 
long. On July 2. upon finishing a draft of his note he sent it to Gray 
120 Gables. On the day the note was received the Whi te House was in a 
fluster over the arrival of a "plump loud-voiced little girl.n121 Olney 
was anxious to hear ot Cleveland's comments regarding his note. Cleveland 
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approved highly of it. He said: 
Its the best thing of the kind I ever read, 
wrote Clevele,nd, and it leads to a conclusion 
that one cannot esoape if he tries - that is, 
if there is anything in the Monroe Dootrine 
at all. You show there is a great deal of 
that, and plaoe it, I think on better and more 
defensible ground than any of your predecessors 
- or mine .122 
40 
Cleveland suggested that Olney take his note to Washington and read it 
to the members of the Cabinet namely, Carlisle, Lamont, Herbert and 
123 Harmon. Immediately upon this reading the note was dispatched. Thus 
this "twenty-inch gun" as Cleveland later refers to it was very belligerent 
in tone. The sharp language of this message regarding Venezuela was to 
bewilder the friends and oritics of the President. The criticism against 
the Presidency that arose due to .this message was severe as we shall see 
later in this paper and the effects it had on the economic phase were to be 
equally as great. 
The "twenty-inch gun" of Secretary Richard Olney of July 20, 1895, was 
a conclusion of the report begun by Secretary Gresham. It is the general 
belief that had Gresham lived to carryon this work himself that such a note 
124 that was so belligerent in tone would never have been drawn up. Due to 
Gresham's illness Olney took charge of affairs and he worked upon the note 
that was dispatched to the British Government regarding the Venezuelan 
--.. _-----------
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situation. 
Perhaps before we investigate the contents of this note it would be 
better if we tried to relate some information regarding the character ot 
Riohard Olney. Richard Olney influenced Cleveland's seoond administration 
125 because of his strong personality_ He was an aggressive leader who was 
moody and had many whims. One of these whims was that of a silent mute -
when a certain mood came upon him he would remain silent and all the 
household remained silent with him whereas when he was in a talkative mood 
126 he could carry a conversation excellently. He exercised domestic 
tyranny over his sister whom he refused to come to his home upon her marriage 
to a suitor whom he had chosen.127 He had self-confidence, ability and he 
was a worker. He had suoh self-oonfidence in himself that he "regarded 
himself as a mad Ulysses who was the only one capable of directing the 
128 
affairs of 1895 into their proper channels." 
Richard Olney wrote in his note that three thousand miles of ocean 
... _------.... _---
make any permanent political union between an 
European and an American state unnatural and 
inexpedient; that today the United States is 
practically sovereign on this continent, and 
its fiat is law upon the subjects to whioh it 
confines its interposition; and that while the 
United States had thus far been spared great 
125Ibid., citing Life of Richard Olney, 12-19. 
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128 
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warlike establishments. with the powers of 
Europe permanently encamped on Jmerican soil. 
the ideal conditions we have thus far enjoyed 
cannot be expected to continue.129 
42 
After an analysis of the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute Secretary Olney 
pointed out six main features of the dispute: 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6 ) 
the "very large" area of territory in 
dispute; 
the disparity of strength between the 
claimants; 
the extreme age of the controversy; 
Venezuela's persisted desire for 
arbitration; 
Great Britain's retusal to go to 
arbitration except upon condition of 
the renunciation of a large part of the 
Venezuelan claim. end 
the United States has made it clear to 
Great Britain end to the world that the 
controversy is one in which both its 
honour and its interests are involved, 
and the continuance of which it cannot 
regard with indifference.130 
The main theme of Olney's note was that England's interference in 
Venezuela was a strict violation of the Monroe DOotrine and if England 
continued this policy it would be considered as an unfriendly aot towards 
Amerioa and would strain relations between the two nations.13l Olney had 
directed his note at the right target and it found a vulnerable spot in the 
Monroe Doctrine. Al though the Monroe Doctrine had not been adopted as an 
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international policy it was highly respected by the Amerioan people and it 
served as a good standby_ Thus it was to this that Olney appealed to in 
his note of July 20, 1895, knowing that 4merican public opinion would not 
permit the flouting of the Monroe Doctrine by any power not even Great 
Britain. 
Cleveland also expressed his extreme satisfaction especially from the 
diplomatic point of view. He realized that the note was belligerent but 
it had achieved its purpose in that it had awakened the national spirit. He 
also stated that it was difficult for him to express his complete pleasure 
over this but he emphasized that the world owed something of a debt to 
132 Richard Olney. 
Despite this belligerent note sent by Olney the attitude of Great 
Britain was still one of non-arbitration as we shall see very shortly in 
the information that is to follow. There were many inaccuracies in Olney's 
note which are noted elsewhere in this pap~r but the main idea of Olney as 
well as of Cleveland was to make Great Britain sit up and take notice. They 
came to the conclusion that the only way this point could be achieved was 
by a frank belligerent note that~ould make Britain sit up and take 
notice.133 It is little wonder then that it is referred to as the 
"twenty-inch gun" because the two men behind it believed they would get an 
132 George F. Parker. ReCOllections of Grover Cleveland. The Century Co., 
New York, 1909, 197-198. 
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1.mmediate reply-
This note was made an issue in the New York Herald which gave the 
impression that the United States was on the verge of war and had given 
134 Great Britain a ninety day ultimatum. Even in the meeting of Congress in 
December the fear of war was felt among the members and a prayer was offered 
135 tor peace. 
While the Olney note was in the process ot being dispatched there was 
a change in the ministry in England from Roseberry to Salisbury. Thomas F. 
Bayard was greatly pleased with this ohange and he wrote to President 
Cleveland rather enthusiastioally that he believed that conditions would 
tend to be much more satisfactory than previously and negotiations between 
Great Britain and the United States would tend toward a settlement ot the 
136 
question in dispute. Bayard also emphasized that it was not necessary 
to impress our policy on Great Britain and that instead careful precaution 
131 
should be taken with Venezuela tor whom he had great distrust. 
Cleveland was whole heartedly supported by Olney in the determination 
that the problem must be settled. Lord Salisbury, an aristocrat and 
oonservative was equally as oapable in his position. He was an ardent 
fighter tor British interests and he had as his assistant Joseph Chamberlain • 
.. _-........ _---..... 
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Joseph Chamberlain had a great deal of parliamentary experience and was 
138 intent on ·preserving and strengthening the empire." Of the four. 
Cleveland and Salisbury were oautious whereas Chamberlain and Olney were 
still devoted to the idea of Jmglo-American friendship.139 
Olney awaited a reply from Salisbury but the reply was inexcusably 
140 delayed. Bayard wrote to Cleveland that he expressed to the British 
ministry the wish for a speedy reply. one that would oome before the 
President's message to Congress in Deoember. August. September and Ootober 
rolled by with no reply from Downing Street. Olney made inquires with no 
results. 
In the North ~erioan Review Henry Cabot Lodge had requested the 
recognition of the supremacy of the Monroe Dootrine if not peaceably. 
141 forcibly. Senator Chandler in the Concord Monitor wrote an article in 
which he said that war was inevitable.142 Cleveland was disturbed at the 
way conditions were swaying and he was even more disturbed when he failed 
143 to receive a reply from Salisbury. This delay as was disoovered later 
--_ ..... _---------
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was not due to deliberation but was due to the pressing diplomatio proble~s 
in the Near East. Cleveland felt the Monroe Dootrine had been ohallenged 
and the United States must make this good by getting Britain to arbi-
144 
trate. 
Salisbury was very much preoocupied with the affairs in the Near East 
and did not make it his duty to see when Congress was in session. His 
advisers permitted him to ~ake an error in regard to this. Bayard on the 
other hand did not put much emphasis on the matter as a grave issue. In 
his visits to Salisbury he gave him the impression that Olney's "twenty-
inoh gun" was not to be considered seriously.145 Henry White regarded 
Bayard as inefficient whereas Olney regarded him as a ~sfit· and Lord 
Salisbury regarded him as an "amateur diplomat.,,145 Olney was of the 
opinion that Bayard should be removed from office and he suggested this 
step to Cleveland. President Cleveland favored this idea but thought it 
was too late to do any recalling and it would undoubtedly cause much 
147 disturbanoe and in the long run do more harm than good. 
On December 2. President Cleveland sent his message to Congress and 
on leaving instructions with Olney he set out on a duck-hunting trip. He 
144 
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informed Olney that if any reply was reoeived within the period of his 
return he should keep the oontents seoret. Cleveland said, -If I were here 
I should not be hurried in the matter even if the Congress should begin 
grinding again the resolution-of-the inquiry mi11. nl48 
148 
Alejandro Alvarez. The Monroe Dootrine: Its Importanoe in the 
International Life of the States of the New World. Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1924, 416. 
\ II \ 
II 
! 
Iii 
CHAPTER VI 
TWISTING THE LION'S TAIL149 
In the late eighties and early nineties there was a great feeling ot 
Anglophobia in Amerioan political lite.150 It took very little urging to 
turther arouse America against England. This was to an extent accomplished 
by anti-British textbooks.151 The feeling toward England was so intense 
that she was labeled as a land-grabber who was in a sense trying to b~ ott 
the United States trom giving protection. It was not very long before 
England and the United States would became friends but until this was 
accomplished the general theme of the United States was strictly anti-British 
An example is one theme given by Thomas Marshall ota group ot boys singing 
it one tourth ot July: 
Fee, fi, to, fum 
I smell the blood ot an Englishman; 
Dead or alive, I'll have some. 
Fee, fi, fo, tum.152 
Another example of protest against Great Britain is that shown in the 
reaotion ot Senator Henry Cabot Lodge ot Massachusetts, a Republioan and an 
----~----------
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Anglophobe. He states: . 
It Great Britain is to be permitted to 
ocoupy the ports ot Nicaragua and, still 
worse, take the territory ot Venezuela, 
there is nothing to prevent her taking 
the whole ot Venezuela or any other South 
Amerioan State. It Great Britain oan do 
this with impunity, Franoe and Germany 
will do it also.... The Supremacy ot the 
Monroe Doctrine should be established and 
at once - peaceably it we can, torcibly 
it we must.153 
49 
This seemed to be the general trend of atfairs in December ot 1895. 
Thus far as we saw by the end ot the preoeding chapter no reply had been 
dispatched by Lord Salisbury to the American government in reply to the 
"twenty-inoh gun" note. The general exouse given tor its delay is that 
Salisbury had made an error in the meeting ot Congress and it was due to this 
that they took more time to deliberate and to weigh oarefully the reply that 
they would send to the United States. Other authorities are ot the opinion 
that Joseph Chamberlain was instrumental in the delay ot the reply. It is 
believed that Chamberlain held that it England were too willing to show 
interest in the prinoiple ot arbitration she would in turn bring upon herself 
/ 
new boundary olaims made by her respective neighbors throughout her Empire.154 
Despite all this the note was dispatohed on November 26, and it was 
tinally received on December 7, when Sir Julian Pauncetote brought Salisbury's 
reply to Olney. Salisbury's note oonsisted ot two seotions - one pertaining 
l53Lodge, 658. 
l54Nev1ns, Cleveland, 637. 
50 
to the Konroe Doctrine and the other to the Venezuelan dispute. SalisbUT1 
stated that the Monroe Doctrine was not regarded as international law. 
Salisbury in his Dote also tended to refute same of the statements of Olney. 
Olney stated in his note that Venezuela olaimed as her boundary as far as the 
Essequlbo River. Olney also stated 
••• there are oircumstances under which 
a nation may justly interpose in a 
controversy to whioh two or more other 
nations are the direct and immediate 
parties.... The dootrine is ordinarily 
expressed in terms of the most general 
oharaoter and is perhaps incapable of 
more specific statement. It is declared 
in substanoe that a nation may avail 
itself of this right whenever what is 
done or proposed by a~ of the parties 
primarily conoerned is a serious and 
direot menace to its own integrity. 
tranquillity or welfare.155 
Olney feared Great Britain-s taking suoh steps that might result in the 
expansion of her boundaries and for this he fell baok on the non-colonization 
principle of the Konroe Doctrine. Olney stated no European power would 
deprive ~ American State of the right of lelf-goverDment; he allo stated 
that the Monroe Dootrine was instigated by Great Britain. "who at once gave 
to it an open and unqualified adhesion which has never been withdrawn.nl56 
According to Professor Perkins that last statement of Olney's should have 
made "George Canning turn in his grave."161 He further related that the 
--~----------.-
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emancipation ot South America rested with the Monroe Doctrine • 
••• Europe as a Whole is monarohical, 
and, ••• is committed to the monarchical 
principle. America, on the other hand is 
devoted to the exactly opposite principle, 
to the idea that every people has an 
inalienable right ot selt-government •••• 
If ••• the torcible intrusion of European 
powers into American politics is to be 
deprecated, it, as it is to be deprecated, 
it should be resisted and prevented, such 
resistance and prevention must come trom 
the United States.158 
51 
Olney by his very torward note caused the arousing ot a suspicion in the 
American mind of British interests in Latin America which they in turn 
labeled as a spirit ot imperialism.1S9 
Salisbury's reply although delayed was to the point and matter ot taot. 
He rejected any reterence to the Monroe Doctrine because he did not believe 
the situation in any way violated the principles ot 1823. Salisbury held 
that this dispute of frontier was far afield trom the questions dealt with 
by President Monroe. In addition, he tried to emphasize that in 1895 the 
issue was quite the opposite trom the issue ot 1823. The question in 1895 
was not one of the oolonization of any part ot America by a European Power 
or the imposition of a European system or torm ot government upon a Latin 
~---.----------
l58Tansill, 706. 
159Ibid., 707 • 
........... 
52 
Amerioan oountry. The only question oonoerned was the settlement or a 
boundary line or a possession or Britain long before the existenoe of the 
Venezuelan Republio.160 Olney's note had an air of belligerenoe and defianoe 
but Salisbury's note was equally to the point in that he took a definite 
stand that although he held highly or the Monroe Dootrine he refused to see 
161 its application in this oase. England was in a sense hinting to the 
United States that the Venezuelan controversy in no way involved the 
162 interests of the United States and therefore it was none or her business. 
Salisbury also made rererence to Olney's statement that -three thousand 
miles of ocean make any permanent poll tical union between an European and 
an American state unnatural and inexpedient" and maintained that the union 
between Great Britain and her territories in the Western Hemisphere (Canada, 
Jamaioa, Trinidad, British Honduras and British Guiana) are both natural 
d d · t 163 an expe 1en • 
Perhaps it was only fitting and proper that in reply to the -twenty. 
inoh gun- note of Olney that Salisbury should draw up suoh a reply that 
was definitely to the point. Salisbury had experienoe in the field of 
politioal affairs and he was aided by suoh personages as Joseph Chamberlain, 
William Ewart Gladstone and Arthur Balfour. Salisbury was placed in a not 
-... -----_ .. ---.. -
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too difficult position but it gradually emerged as a difficult situation. 
Salisbury stated his pOint as in the inapplicability of the doctrine, the 
history of the controversy and he believed that with these points brought 
forward that the United States would withdraw. This could not easily be 
aooomplished because the Olney note was regarded in a sense as an 
ultimatum and if either nation withdrew now it would be a blow to the 
national honor and prestige. In addition Salisbury did not realize that 
the American public would be aroused to suoh a height of enthusiasm that it 
would take the Monroe Doctrine and adopt it to any ciroumstanoe that might 
arise. lS4 The American public thus became interested in a doctrine partly 
disregarded for a time and now realized that it was intended as a part of 
the national lite and that as long as the Republio endured it could not 
become obsolete.lS5 
The position of Cleveland and Olney at the time was indeed a diffioult 
one for the belligerent tone used by Olney in his note to England was very 
harsh and took the attitude of treating "England as though she Were a petty 
culprit oaught in the act of thievery.n lSS This situation was not like the 
railway strikes where it was perhaps neoessary to use a severe and harsh 
164 
Robert Glass Cleland. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Dootrine. Times-
Mirror Press, Los Angeles, california, 1923, 86. 
lS5 
Charles R. Miller. "The Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan Dispute." The 
Centurr, New York, (1913), LXXXVI, 755. 
lS6 
Tansill, 709. 
I I 
i I 
I II 
~~--------------~ 
54 
n b ~ "1 k .167 tone to rowueat ra1 way stri era. The question now remained as to 
hoW they could ease out without bestowing any harm to the national honor of 
their nation. One author applies to Olney's arguments the Oxford under-
graduates account of the football game: "It would have been just as good 
a tight without the ball; the ball was only in the way."lSS Still another 
author says that Olney realized too late that "he had uncoched a genii. 
which he was unable to return to the bottle in which King Solomon had once 
sealed him up.n169 
167 
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CHAPTER VII 
RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE IN .AMERICA 
Great Britain refused all arguments and her answer to arbitration was 
still in the negative. She had Venezuela on the spot. She said to Venezuela: 
You oan get none of the debatable land by foroe, 
beoause you are not strong enough; you oan get 
none by treaty, beoause I will not agree; and 
you oan take your ohance of getting a portion 
as I may designate.170 
It was this trend of oiroumstanoes that direoted President Cleveland 
on Deoember 7, 1895, to deliver a speoial message to Congress. Again this 
note was drawn up by Riohard Olney and it was looked over by Cleveland and 
Lamont. Cleveland went over the note but there is oonsiderable doubt whether 
he did muoh to tone it down. The main message in the note was :tor the 
appropriation of $100,000 for a oommission to investigate and determine the 
Venezuelan boundary. This speoial message to Congress reoeived the full 
support of Congress. The message was read by Senator Cox. One author in 
the Chioago Daily Tribune says of this message, "It is the hand of Esau, but 
the voice of Jacob."171 
170 
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Olneyt s note whioh was slightly revised by Cleveland read as follows: 
When suoh report is made and aooepted it will 
then be the duty of the government to oommuni-
oate to Great Britain the boundary lines thus 
asoertained, and to give notioe that any ap-
propriation of territory or exeroise of juris-
diotion by Great Britain beyond that line, 
exoept with the consent of Venezuela will be 
regarded by this government as a wilful ag-
gression upon rights and interests of the 
United States whioh this government oannot 
suffer to go undefended. In making these 
reoommendations I do not aot without a keen 
sense of responsibility nor without a vivid 
realization of all possible oonsequenoes ••• 
I am nevertheless firm in the faith in whioh 
I doubt not to have the hearty conourrenoe of 
all the Amerioan people - that of all the 
oalamities to which a great nation oan subject 
itself none are more to be deprecated or more 
to be shunned than those which follow from a 
supine submission to wrong and injustice and 
the consequent loss of national honor and 
selt respect.172 
Cleveland also makes reference in his message of this date to the British 
refusal to accept the Monroe Doctrine and its failure to meet the re-
quirements of international,law and its olassification as a "novel principle" 
that did not receive the recognition of other oountries previous to this 
date.173 
In the Baltimore Maryland Herald the cry was that now England had 
enoountered her matoh in the field of diplomacy.174 In the Chicago Dailx 
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!ribune the orywas "Fight or BaokDownt n175 w«e have had a few wars, 
some of whioh England may remember; and we appreoiate the horrors and 
waste of treasures which they bring, but we will always fight for the right, 
and when we fight we oonquer. wl76 The American press shared Cleveland's and 
Olney's attitude of distrust of Great Britain's interest in Venezuela. In 
1894 the New York Sun warned the British that if the situation was not 
altered in Nioaragua that Britain would find herself involved with the Unite 
States.177 In the Nsw York Tribune it stated that if measures were taken by 
England ~y bombardment or armed foroe to bully Nioaragua into paying a 
bill of damages which has been arbitrarily levied against her, the State 
Department ought to issue a new edition of the Monroe Dootrine with a mar-
178 ginal reading espeoially adapted to the oase." 
When Britain took an interest in Nioaragua the American ire was aroused. 
John B. McMaster firmly stated that the Monroe Dootrine did not give the 
United States any jurisdiotion to interfere in any wars between Europe and 
the South American republios especially when the major conoern of Britain in 
th · t 11 t th t f . d--"t 1 79 1S oase was 0 00 eo e paymen 0 an 1n O~ y. 
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Some of the general reactions of the leading men in the states were 
as follaws: in 1899 ex-Governor Campbell of Ohio was of the opinion that 
England's venture was to persuade the United States to abandon the Monroe 
Doctrine and together with this idea he suggested that the United States 
maintain the same position she had held in 1866 in the case of Louis 
Napoleon in Mexioo. Another leader, Captain Mahan expressed his view that 
England's interference in any Amerioan State would not be long tolerated by 
the Amerioan people and he is of the opinion that they would endeavor to 
180 prevent such a step from being ventured into. 
The Atlanta Constitution on October 13, 1895, warned the United States 
that if she didn't awaken soon she would awaken too late and find Central 
and South Amerioa in the hands of Great Britain.18l The New Orleans Pioayuna 
d that th M Do t · b d t d f i 1· 182 urge e onroe c r1ne e a op e as our ore gn po 10Y. The New 
York Times warned the United States that she ·oould not with indifference see 
a European power, not even England, invade a weak South Amerioan State, and 
on no better title than the highwayman establishes to the traveler's purse, 
rob her of a sixth part of her territory.-183 In this same issue oiting the 
TheWestminister Gazette it made referenoe to the controversy: ·Venezuela, 
like Nicaragua after much fuss, will probably prove to be small beer. No 
180 
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doubt the less sorupulous of New York Papers will talk big about what they 
are going to do with the lion's tail, but Great Britain and the United 
states are not going to be set by the ears by a paok of Venezuelans.w184 
Theodore Roosevelt Was in favor of war.185 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
maintained that the United States would not forsake the Monroe Dootrine or 
her rights in the Western Hemisphere and if neoessary she would go to war to 
186 preserve her rights. 
There was a great deal of oriticism of Cleveland in regard to the stand 
he took in Venezuela. Some people were of the opinion that he was bluffing 
whereas others state that there is little possibility that Cleveland would 
have risked a war to gain his point.187 John Bassett Moore did not believe 
that Cleveland's message was a bluff beoause he held that Cleveland would 
not want to pursue a similar polioy to that of Louis XIV. l88 The note ot 
Olney was agreed to by Cleveland beoause he realized the only way to arouse 
Britain to realize the important position of the United States was to send 
189 
suoh a note. Others were amazed when Cleveland took this step beoause 
they realized the odds were too great and in the oase of war the British 
exoeeded the United States in man power and in war equipment. The Amerioan 
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army numbered 25,000 men and 2,160 officers to the British 147,959 men and 
7,496officers.190 The United States had six battleships, seven first-olass 
oruisers, three torpedo orafts and a navy of 12,656 to Great Britain's 
forty-four battleships, forty-one first-olass oruisers, one hundred and 
191 thirty-six torpedo orafts and navy of 83,400. 
The Philadelphia Press of October 23, 1895, said that this was not an 
electoral dodge but an expression of American sentiment.192 Some oritics 
believed that it was also a party effort to gain the vote of the Irish-
~ericans and to set up a new campaign issue and to give "the lion's tail a 
twist on the eve of the presidential election."l93 The truth of this state-
ment is questioned. However, there is record made of an Irish alliance 
offering the services of 100,000 volunteers ready to aid America at a moments 
194 
notice. 
Edwin L. Godkin, Carl Sohurz, Charles W. Eliot condemned Cleveland for 
the position he took in regard to this dispute.195 Joseph Pulitzer tried to 
emphasize that this commotion over someone else's frontier was a complete 
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196 blunder. He cabled to the Prince of Wales to get his view point of the 
situation and the reply he reoeived was enoouraging because in it the 
Prinoe of Wales expressed his hope that the two powers would resume their 
f · d h' 197 r1en S 1p. 
The individual Britons were opposed to war suoh as William Ewart 
198 Gladstone, Cardinal Vaughn, Arohbishop of Armagh. In the London Times 
of January I, 1896, James Bryoe tried to bring home his point that not one 
man out of ten in the House of Commons even knew that there was suoh a 
thing as the Venezuelan question.199 The British did not want a war with 
Amerioa and especially not at a time when she had many difficulties in other 
seotions of the globe. There were many articles written about this time 
whioh tried to promote Anglo-Amerioan friendship and whioh stressed the 
point that these two nations should be on the best of terms beoause of their 
oommon interests. 
Great Britain was indeed eager that the President would not be baoked 
by Congress and she fervently hoped that the situation would drag along 
until at least Cleveland was out of offioe. 2OO John Hay who was in London 
196 
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made it evident that even though there might be a ohange in the administra-
tion there was very little possibility that Amerioa would now retreat from 
201 
the position she had taken. It was unlikely that now the question of 
the Monroe Dootrine was revived that the amerioan people would allow it to 
202 fall into the baokground. 
Cleveland was severely aooused of the method he employed and some 
oritios say he did this to reoeive patriotio applause. It is believed that 
although Cleveland had thrust a bomb into British oiroles that he had 
attaohed a safety valve to it whioh would produoe the neoessary results 
desired namely the realization by England of ~rioats full grown power. 203 
Amerioa is then said to have been ftlooking England in the eye ft and there 
was definitely no bluff. 204 
Joseph Chamberlain wanted to restore amicable relations between the two 
great powers and he considered it would be absurd and a orime for the two 
nations to go to war over suoh a question as Venezuela. His hope was that 
in the very near future the ·Stars and Stripes and the Union Jaok would be 
floating together in defense of a common oause.n205 
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Some clever cartoons are depicted in the London Punch of December 28, 
1895, extending the "compliments of the season- to Great Britain following 
the speech of Cleve1and.206 In a cartoon of the London Funch of May 23, 
1896, Columbus is pictured as stating that had he foreseen that his 
discovery would have caused such a controversy he would not have discovered 
America. 207 In still another issue of the London Punch a cartoon depicts 
the satisfaction of England on getting the better bargain of the deal. 208 
England thus found herself in a difficult position especially in her 
economic relations because this controversy brought England on the verge of 
a quarrel with the nation that was her prinCipal provider and to lose this 
209 for the sake of a piece of land was indeed absurd. Without a doubt 
England must have secretly rejoiced that Parliament was not in session2lO 
at the time of the enunciation of Cleveland's message and that the Cabinet 
members undertook to view the crisis and to act accordingly. 
The message of Cleveland also aroused much criticism in other parts of 
the globe. In France the reaction was one of great pleasure in seeing the 
position of Lord Salisbury being made difficult, however the French did not 
altogether approve Cleveland's tone because if it now applied to England it 
206 
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might in the near future oause a complete turnabout and apply in France's 
case in a similar boundary controversy.2ll The French President is said to 
have stated to the German Ambassador in the Die Grosse Politik, ~(ho will 
put his trust in a country, of which the highest executive in an ugly mood 
or tor election purposes will plunge the country into a devastating war?n2l2 
Bismarck denounced the policy ot 1823 and in the London Standard ot 
Deoember 20, 1895, Germany referred to Cleveland's message ot December 17 
as an tlepithet of jingoism ... 2l3 
Thus in England the situation as it stood was regarded as a patriotic 
upheaval that originated with Cleveland's message and one that would slmw1y 
die out. The English were equally determined that they did not want a war 
and they believed that some means would be found by which the two nations 
214 
would set themselves on the tracks of peace. Away out had to be found. 
In the meantime the anti-British press urged that if Britain did not come 
off her high horse there would be a war and this was to be avoided especial-
ly since neither power cared a "tittle about Venezuela."2l5 Their main 
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interest was to maintain amicable relations between two powers whioh had 
216 
major interests in common and to avoid a "fratrioidal war." 
216 
William L. Langer. The Diplomaoy of Imperiali~ 1890-1902. Alfred A. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE IN AMERICA (continued) 
With the enunciation of his special message to Congress on December 17, 
1895, Cleveland was to realize whether or not he had the support of the 
American public. In the Senate and House of Representatives the message was 
i h · 217 rece ved with great ent us~asm. 
The general attitude of the members of the Senate and the House was one 
of acceptance of the Cleveland policy. Senator Stewart of Nevada favored 
war even if it resulted in defeat if for the only result that it would end 
the British bank rule of the United States.218 Senator Morgan of Alabama 
219 
firmly denounced Britain's policy. When Representative Livingston of 
Georgia was asked what the position of the United States would be if Great 
Britain refused arbitration he only too readily replied to the effect that 
the United States would fight and she would definitely not permit Great 
Britain to acquire additional territory in the Western Hemisphere - they 
220 
would rather go to war first. 
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In the New York World, Joseph Pulitzer denounced the message as a grave 
blunder and made reference that it had the "design of a coup' d' etat by 
01 ,,221 ney. Representative Morse felt that any war over such things as a 
Venezuelan boundary or seals of Alaska would be a step backward in the clock 
222 
of progress and peaoe. 
Senator Cullom of Illinois stated in one case: 
We do not olaim that the world is ours, but we 
will insist on our right to be consulted upon 
affairs pertaining to the Amerioan oontinents. 
~-e do not, like Don Quixote, go pranoing about 
the world looking for adventure or seeking for 
some imprisoned princess or struggling nation 
to set free, but we acknowledge kinship in a 
degree with all the Republios of Amerioa, whose 
independence like ours, has long since been 
acknowledged and recognized by the powers of 
Europe. The United States cannot sit indiffer-
ently by when the territorial integrity of any 
of these neighboring countries is questioned 
by a foreign nation. 223 
Cullom also had stated that if the United States had protested England's 
occupation of Corinto, she would not have progressed so far. Now that she 
had gone this far he advised the use of force in getting her out.224 
Senator Lodge of Massachusetts praised highly the President's policy in 
Venezuela but he believed that the President should have included in his 
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message the objection to "forcible" possession in the Americas. 225 McCreary 
of Kentucky believed that Cleveland should be given full support on this 
issue despite party affiliations.226 Representative Curtis of Kansas in his 
support of the President states, "I was with Daniel ~ebster that my politics 
.227 
extends cnly to the water's edge ••• 
Ex-Governor of Ohio Joseph B. Foraker believed that the Monroe Doctrine 
should be uPheld228 and that the Central and South American States should 
be made to feel that in the United States they had a protector and a 
friend. 229 John Bassett Moore was led to believe that America was looking 
for a fight and that the American people were getting " ••• irritable lest 
the world might think us not worth insulting.u230 
In the New York Sun Charles A. ~a a "not infrequent beater of tom-tom 
of jingoism" took every chance to make the controversy a front page issue 
and his editorials supported the upholding of the Monroe Doctrlne. 231 E. L. 
Godkin of the Nation was of the opposite opinion and he stated that the 
tendency of the American people was to keep silent on the issues of the day 
especially those relative to foreign affairs so that there would be no 
225 
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reason to suspect them of unpatriotic tendencies.232 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a resolution based on the Monroe 
Dootrine and he inferred any attempt on the part of any European power to 
act contrary to this policy would be dangerous to the peace and safety of 
233 
the United States and be regarded e.s an act of hostility. 
Senator Cullom of IllinoiS, a Republioan passed a milder resolution 
and stated that it was time the Monroe Doctrine was recognized as a 
proclamation of our national polioy.234 He also stated that this national 
polioy should be -indelibly engraved upon the portals of the State Depart-
ment." and "bear the definite approval of Congress and beoome a fixed and 
t di "235 permanen or nanoe. 
Representative Livingston of Georgia proposed a resolution for a joint 
commission to examine the merits of the controversy between Great Britain 
and Venezuela. 236 
The Republican floor leader, Representative Bitt introduoed a bill to 
meet the request of the President's message and this was passed unanimously 
and reached the Senate on December 19. Here it was referred to a oommittee 
which reported on it the following day. The praises of the President and 
232 
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of the principles of 1823 were sung and finally passed unanimously in tho 
237 Senate. 
The New York World tried to get the opinions of the governors of the 
states in regard to the President's polioy and they reported that twenty-six 
out of twenty-eight who replied unqualified in support of the Adminis-
238 
tration. Also the New York World declared the President's fear of 
danger from Britain in regard to Guiana "nothing less than a jingo 
bugaboo."239 
Those in aoademio oircles suoh as Professor Theodore S. Woolsey, the 
professor of international law at Yale University, Professor Von Holst of 
Chicago, President Hyde of Bowdoin and rrofessor Frank W. Taussig of 
Harvard oonsidered Cleveland's language as needless and bellioose espeoially 
in its referenoe to the violation of the Monroe Doctrine.240 
The financial system also felt a blow following the message of Deoember 
17, 1895. In many politioal oiroles espeoially those of the opposition 
party the general belief was that the message was made to strengthen the 
dmi • t ti d 1>1> t f W 11 St t . 241 a n1S ra on an an e~~or 0 a ree oonsp1racy. I t was without 
a doubt that the note should cause a disturbanoe whiohwas in the effect of 
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a temporary panic. In the New York Tribune at this time th 
71 
ere was 
reported an effect on the stock market and a decline in whe\t and cotton.243 
The New York Herald of December 22, 1896 in an article by G. W. Smalley 
estimates the loss of $400,000,000 in two days. 2« 
The ~resident had indeed thrown business into a state of confusion and 
many regarded this as a complete blunder on the p'art of Cle~eland.245 The 
business interests in Boston and New York were opposed to Cleveland's 
I policy.246 Xhis bellicose enunoiation of policy created a period of war 
nerves and aroused much opposition against Cleveland from the pulpit as well 
as from finanoial oiroles. For this reason prayers for pe~oe were offered 
up at the opening of the sessions of the Senate and the Ho~se of Repre-
t ' 247 senta ~ves. 
The business leaders such as Frederick D. Tappin, Pre~ident of the 
Gallatin National Bank and Charles S. Smith, ex-President Of the New York 
Chamber of Commerce regarded Cleveland's message as a grav~ blunder and the 
242 
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crime of the oentury. In the New York World the fall in seourities was 
estimated at more than $350,000,000.249 
The finanoial situation at this time was made an object of advertise-
ment in The New York Daily Tribune which said that it was perhaps likely 
that Cleveland would set right the financial situation but that the "ONLY 
CERTAIN CURE FOR COUGH OR COLD IS RICKER'S EXPbCTORANT. n250 
The reaction of Latin America toward the United States policy in 
Venezuela was equally as important. The Mexican journals looked on Cleve-
land's message of Deoember 17, 1895 with great favor. 25l In the El Uni-
versal, the Mexioo City Editor states, "Once more the strong people ~ 
excellenoe of the oontinent have come to the aid of the weak and championed 
it against aggression; the eagle of the North whioh has been falsely acoused 
of voraoity has held in awe the insatiable British Lion. n252 The El Partido 
Liberal credited Cleveland's message as an electoral triok. 253 The El 
, 
Pregoneros of Caracas was very muoh enthused with the message and urged 
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patriotic affairs to be held to honor the United States.254 As a result the 
S~on Bolivar Club put on a parade honoring the United States with speeohes 
and plaoed floral deoorations on the statue of George ~ashington.255 
The EI FerrQoarril of Sonsonata in Salvador said of Cleveland's message, 
Monroe has opened to Cleveland the doors of the 
temple. In his turn Cleveland, if possible, has 
oonfined greater immortality upon Monroe. Amerioa 
has immortalized both Presidents, for she does 
justioe to her benefaotor. The Message of Cleve-
land •••• has been the oompliment of American 
independenoe; or rather this state paper, which 
has made effective and practioal a saving Doctrine 
that for many years was considered platonio and 
theoretical, has had the effect of a JIlOral and 
politioal victory. Without cannon or bloodshed 
the exposition of the illustrious President has 
been as significant as a new battle of Ayaouohot 
it is a new seal of our continental emanoipation\ 
Spanish Americans actually do not know whether to 
aocord more greatness and nobility to the ohampi-
ons of their independenoe or to Monroe and Cleve-
land - the ohampions of their international 
emanoipation ••• In that aohievement Monroe has 
been the brain and Cleveland, the arm\256 
The Latin-American oountries prior to this time feared greatly the . 
Colossus of the North but with the deolaration of this message they beoame 
familiar with ~erica's polioy but still they took precautions lest the 
United States adopt the ideas of the European nations in regard to South 
.lmerioa • 
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The problem has been stated. the attitudes of the various nations eon-
eerned enumerated and there raaains only the solution. The period between 
Deoember 17. 1695 and January 2. 1896 was a gloomy period for each nation had 
in a sense presented the other with an ulttmatum.257 The day was saTed by 
the report of Dr. Jameson's raid in the Transvaal which had failed and 
immediately upon which the Ger.man Government sent a telegram of praise to 
257 President Kruger. Only a short time before when Rhodes had asked what 
possible way out there was in suoh a difficult situation where two nations 
had issued notes that had the tone of ultimatums. the reply given to him was. 
"One or the other." he said, "must orawl. but the news in to-night's paper 
shows the resolution of the difticulty."259 This was the news of the Jmneson 
raid and it is on this basis that the Krueger telegram earned its reference 
aa the "Deux ex machina."260 The purpose cf the Kaiser's telegram is said 
to have been to make England realize that she should ally herself with Ger-
261 many. 
Great Britain realized the predicament she was plaoed in and she agreed 
to arbitrate the dispute. Measures were taken by both parties to settle 
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the dispute. The United States and Great Britain realized that a step in 
any direction other than towards arbitration would serve only to oreate a 
diplomatic crisis. It was this feeling together with the after effects of 
the Kruger telegram that encouraged negotiations between London and 
Washington. The oommission requested by Cleveland was drawn up to in-
vestigate conditions relative to the dispute. England offered her &ssis-
tance in presenting her side of the oontroversy. 
The commission was made up of suoh names as David J. Brewer, associate 
justice of the Supreme Court, Richard H. Alvey, chief justice of the oourt 
of appeals of the District of Columbia, Andrew D. ~ite, Frederic R. 
Coudert, and Daniel Coit Gilman.262 
Friendly relations were established between Great Britain and Venezuela 
and a treaty was signed on February 2, 1897. The dispute was submitted to 
an arbitration board which exempted any area held by either party for a 
period of fifty years. 263 The arbitration board also made provision for an 
arbitral tribunal which would consist of five members. One of the members 
would be nominated by the judges of the $upreme Court of the United States, 
two of the members would be nominated by the English Supreme Court of 
Justioe, one of the members nominated by Venesuela and the fifth member 
would be nominated by the four or in the case of disagreement by the 
.-.. ------...... _ ... 
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16 
The final deoision ot the dispute was reached on Ootober 3. 1899 at 
Paris. The arbitral tribunal consisted ot David J. Brewer. Melville Weston 
Fuller, Lord Russell of Killowen. Sir Richard Henn Collins and Frederic 
de Martens, oouncillor of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Attairs.265 
According to the tinal decision the boundary was run along the Sohomburgk 
line and Venezuela was given control ot the mouth ot the Orinoco. In this 
instanoe Venezuela fared m.uch better than it the United States had not 
interfered. 
While these negotiations were in progress Olney and Paunoetote also 
signed a general arbitration treaty on January 11, 1897. This treaty was 
presented to the Senate but it was dragged aloDg Until it beoame an issue 
266 in th& next administration. The Senate managed to tack on amendments 
that would determine whioh questions would be subjeot to arbitration and 
wnioh would be ex~pt. In addition it a180 stated that two-thirds vote of 
267 the Senate would be required. The Senate finally rejeoted this treaty 
on May 5. 1897 by a vote ot 43 to 26.268 
The rejeotion ot the treaty is credited to the Senate's fear of 
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permitting suoh questions a8 might arise pertaining to foreign polioy to be 
deoided by an arbitral board.269 Some of the Senators who opposed the 
treaty were silverites who opposed Britain -as the bulwark of the gold 
standard. "270 
This trend of affairs was a terrific blow to the "lovers of peace"271 
but it wasn't going to oause a rift in the amicable relations of the 
United States and Great Britain whioh had been restored upon the eve ot a 
diplomatio crisis. 
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CONCLUSION 
Another ohapter in the history of the United States and Great Britain's 
diplomatio relations was brought to a olose by peaoeable means. The importe 
ant points that had been advanoed by this episode were the arousing of the 
Konroe Doctrine to meet and help iron out a diffioult situation and the 
prinoiple ot arbitration. Ka~ authors are led to believe that had the 
Konroe Doctrine not existed there is a great probability that England would 
have pursued a regular "grab bag game" in South Amerioa. This stand that 
Cleveland and Olney took in regard to the Monroe Dootrine oaused an emergenoe 
of jmerioa as a World Power and without a doubt made England sit up and take 
notice. This stand in regard to the Monroe Doctrine also made way for Anglo-
American friendship. 
Thus the Monroe Doctrine, the so-oalled shield for Hispanic Amerioan 
Republio.212 was vindioated and the Venezuelan danger was removed. Without a 
doubt the purpose for whioh the United States had enunoiated this polioy 
toward Venezuela was realized beoause henceforth England would respeot the 
policies of the United States. In addition other European powers would not 
venture to olaim territory in the Western Hemisphere without first consulting 
the United States.213 -
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Thus the prestige of the United States assumed greater tmportanoe and 
Great Britain had eased herselt out of a diftioult situation whioh would 
have been further oomplioated if the anti-British antagonism persisted.214 
"!he British lion slunk away with his muoh-twisted tail between his leg8."215 
The lew World was oalled into existenoe to redress the balances cr the 
Old and Monroe oompared to the great god Terminus who presides over 
boundaries was vindioated216 and what was thought to be a message ot war 
became a "harbinger of peaoe."211 
The poaition of Latin Amerioa was one of praise tor the attitude ot 
the United States in her support of the Amerioas. Although Venezuela 
tavored Amerioan aid there were signs of resentment shown in the attitude ot 
aome of the other Latin Amerioa and Central Amerioa States. 
The most important result of the oontroversy was the return to amioable 
relations ot Great Britain and the United states. Thus the spirit of 
Anglophobia waa replaoed by a spirit of Anglophilism and the "period of 
twisting the lion's tail was tollowed by one ot patting the eagle's head."218 
........ _-._-------
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